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PRESERVING JUSTICE:
DEFENDING TOXIC TORT LITIGATION
Anthony Z. Roisman, Martha L Judy and Daniel Stein'
INTRODUCTION
One of the most remarkable characteristics of the American ex-
periment in democracy is its ability to blend so many disparate peo-
ple and ideas to create a fairly cohesive, albeit extremely flexible,
society. In most nations of the world people of such disparate back-
grounds and ethnic origins rarely inhabit the same territory. When
such a blending is attempted, violence frequently results. America
has been there and done that, and the nation has survived. Perhaps
even more remarkable than America's tolerance of cultural and eth-
nic differences, is its ability to tolerate coexistent ideas and philoso-
phies which are diametrically opposed and constantly competing for
control of the public process. Of all the opposing ideas that perme-
ate American society, none are more fundamentally different and
more basic to our way of life than the idea of free enterprise on the
one hand and government controlled benefits and proscriptions on
the other. Although the pendulum swings between these two ideas,
the arc of the swing remains relatively small. Likewise, the civil
justice system in general and toxic tort litigation in particular swings
between these poles, following a similar arc.
The civil justice system and the practice of trial-by-jury enhance
free enterprise. The American civil justice system provides an inde-
pendent forum with a long history of impartiality, a jury comprised
of peers of the parties to the litigation, rules of procedure that assure
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equal access to information and equal rights to present arguments,
and the right of appeal. The civil justice system and the practice of
trial-by-jury are established and guaranteed by the federal constitu-
tion and by the constitutions of every state.
The civil justice system can be seen as part of our society's
mechanism for allocating the risk of doing business among those
who stand to profit from an enterprise, those users who benefit from
an enterprise and those who may suffer ill effects due to an enter-
prise. Unlike government regulation with its sweeping, one-size-
fits-all proscriptions, the civil justice system is designed to weigh
and resolve the facts and circumstances of each individual case.
This case-by-case system provides an extraordinarily fair process for
the resolution of issues which may not be peaceably resolved in any
other way.
In societies without such a system, issues such as whether the de-
fendant's negligence caused the death of the plaintiffs child might
be settled through acts of personal vengeance or where the number
of similarly aggrieved persons reaches sufficient proportions, by ji-
hads, tribal wars, and insurrections. The most remarkable aspect of
the free enterprise civil justice system in America is that those who
turn to it in search of justice have chosen these peaceful, public and
independent means, rather than violence, to redress the most severe
injuries and the most outrageous injustices. Thus, it is quite surpris-
ing that those interests in America with the most to lose in the event
that the public should turn to "vigilante justice" are in the forefront
of efforts to severely curtail public access to the civil justice system.
Abolishing or curtailing litigation opportunities does not reduce the
number of persons who perceive they have been wronged, but only
the number of options available to them in responding to that per-
ceived wrong.
Nonetheless, there is a concerted effort, which has been building
for at least twenty years, to limit access to the justice system for civil
wrongs. Going under the misnomer of "tort reform," this effort
seeks to restrict monetary recovery for damages, eliminate or se-
verely restrict punitive damages, add costly pre-filing reviews for
claims, increase the burden a plaintiff must carry in order to prevail
in the case, and shift the cost of litigation to the losing party (essen-
tially barring from court those without adequate resources to bear the
risk of losing), to mention only a few of the "reforms" being pro-
posed. One of the most popular targets of "tort reformists" is toxic
tort litigation, where the severity of the injuries caused by exposure
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to toxic substances and the large number of people who may be im-
pacted by such exposures, often leads to very large recoveries.
Many companies that are or may someday be defendants in toxic
tort litigation have mounted a substantial effort to "reform" the tort
law to curtail such litigation. This is understandable, regardless of
the merits of the effort, because toxic tort litigation significantly im-
pacts corporate defendants. It causes substantial financial impacts
when they lose and can create negative public perceptions which are
difficult to change, even when they prevail.2
These efforts to curtail toxic tort litigation focus on the perceived
ineffectiveness of the civil justice system in handling such cases.
But is the system truly in need of reform? Since, at root, these at-
tacks argue that toxic tort litigation ought to be significantly cur-
tailed because it fails to achieve any socially important goals, the
purpose of this article is to evaluate the effectiveness of toxic tort
litigation in achieving two goals: compensation of persons injured by
exposure to toxic substances and products, and creation of an eco-
nomic incentive for producers to reduce the frequency and severity
of such exposures. If toxic tort litigation is meeting these goals, its
retention as a viable cause of action is essential. If not, it is indeed
in need of reform..
In evaluating the current state of toxic tort litigation, it is important
to compare it to other options and not merely to an unattainable ideal
"perfect justice system". As Winston Churchill said, in commenting
on the effectiveness of the democratic system of government:
"[d]emocracy is the worst form of Government except all those other
forms that have been tried ... Absent a better system to address
the claims of persons injured by involuntary exposure to toxic sub-
stances, the current "flawed" system should be repaired, not aban-
doned.
2. As discussed below, although toxic tort litigation may have a
substantial impact on those who are sued, just as the toxic exposures
have a significant impact on those who are exposed, the number of
toxic tort cases is actually quite small. In and of themselves, the
cases do not appear to warrant the kind of sweeping overhauls which
are proposed in the name of toxic tort "reform."
3. Winston Churchill, Speech to the House of Commons (Nov.
11, 1947), in 7 WINSTON S. CHURCHILL: HIS COMPLETE SPEECHES,
1897 - 1963, at 7566 (Robert Rhodes James ed., 1974).
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Before considering alternatives and probing the compensation and
deterrence capabilities of the toxic tort system, this article begins
with an overview, including a brief discussion of that ever popular
first-year-of-law-school question, "what is a tort?" and particular to
this article, "what is a toxic tort?" Common causes of action for
toxic torts are also summarized. The next section explores impedi-
ments to plaintiffs' recovery for injuries resulting from toxic torts,
particularly those torts for which identification of the cause of the
harm is difficult due to the latency period between exposure and
manifestation of injury. In addition to this latency problem, medical
causation, statutes of limitations, bankruptcy, transaction costs and
the effects of recent Supreme Court cases addressing the role of sci-
entific evidence in the court are also considered. The article then
turns to the fundamental questions of whether the toxic tort litigation
system provides appropriate compensation to deserving plaintiffs
and whether it deters defendants (and potential defendants) from
further actions that may cause harm. The role of the jury system in
resolving disputes and the role of risk shifting are fundamental prin-
cipals that underscore the answers to these two questions. The arti-
cle concludes with some suggestions to improve the toxic tort litiga-
tion system.
I. ToxIc TORTS: AN OVERVIEW
A. What is a Toxic Tort?
In its simplest form a toxic tort is a wrongful injury caused by the
toxic properties of a substance or product, but many commentators
do not agree on any narrower definition or even whether the defini-
tion can be narrowed. 4 Toxic torts may be a type of products liabil-
4. Compare J.D. LEE & BARRY LINDAHL, MODERN TORT LAW:
LIABILITY AND LITIGATION § 28:1 (2d ed. 2002) (discussing "Haz-
ardous Substance Litigation" as litigation involving "substances or
mixtures of substances that present a danger to the public health or
safety, including a substance that is toxic, corrosive, or flammable,
or that is an irritant or that generates pressure through decomposi-
tion, heat or other means"), with LAWRENCE G. CETRULO, Toxic
TORTS LITIGATION GUIDE § 1.2 (1st ed. 2002) (claiming "there is no
pressing need for a 'dictionary' definition. 'Toxic torts' is not a term
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ity,5 or may be its own subset of law distinctly different from all
other types of traditional torts. 6 For purposes of this article, a toxic
tort is a case arising under the civil law process by which individu-
als, who have been exposed to a toxic substance or product which
they believe has caused them injury which was not manifest until
long after that exposure, seek redress for their inIuries from those
who are allegedly liable for causing their exposure.
A number of factors are common to the type of "toxic tort" cases
discussed in this article. These factors include: 1) potentially large
numbers of known or unknown plaintiffs, who have been 2) exposed
to harmful substances or products 3) which create difficulty in estab-
lishing causation, because of 4) the latency between exposure to the
substance and manifestation of adverse impacts, and 5) potentially
numerous defendants, which are typically implicated in exposure in
markedly different ways, thus 6) creating difficulty in assessing the
relative culpability of the defendants, which can lead to 7) multiple,
complex, and costly cases; 8) all of which highlights the need to bal-
ance society's wish to protect and compensate victims with its wish
to preserve business, investment and economic development.
8
Toxic tort cases and laws are a relatively new and unique subset of
modem tort law that has developed over the last fifty plus years,
of art, but is, rather, one of convenience .... Toxic torts has be-
come a catch-all phrase loosely applied to any potential lawsuit in-
volving a substance unfamiliar to the lay public which is suspected
of causing some insidious disease process or which is thought to be
potentially carcinogenic.").
5. See LEE & LINDAHL, supra note 4, § 28:1. "Although hazard-
ous substance litigation is a species of products liability, the cases
present difficult and unusual problems of their own...." Id.
6. See CETRULO, supra note 4, § 1:4, at 1-10 (claiming "[m]ass
torts, in general, and toxic torts, in particular, are 'quite different'
from simple tort cases - cases with two or three parties suing over a
readily-identifiable harm in a well defined area of the law in which
neither product identification nor causation is likely to be at issue.").
7. Scott A. Steiner, The Case Management Order: Use and Effi-
cacy in Complex Litigation and the Toxic Tort, 6 HASTINGS W.-Nw.
J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 71, 75-76 (Fall 1999).
8. LEE & LINDAHL, supra note 4, § 28:3; see also, CETRULO,
supra note 4, § 1:2, at 1-2.
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alongside our rising use of toxic substances and products. 9 Toxic
tort litigation is a dynamic, evolving field of law' ° which advances
with the technological and scientific understanding of the health im-
pacts of toxic substances and products." Some toxic tort cases can
involve exposures to substances or products which have always been
known to be hazardous or are defined as hazardous in statutes and
regulated by the state and/or federal government. Other cases in-
volve exposure to substances or products that were once believed
safe for use or consumption but were ultimately found to cause in-
jury through examination of the adverse health effects suffered by
those exposed to the substances in the past.
Toxic tort cases can be brought in state and/or federal courts under
different theories of liability and recovery.12 The relevant law in-
9. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 148 (1997)
(Breyer, J., concurring) (stating that "modern life, including good
health as well as economic well-being, depends upon the use of arti-
ficial or manufactured substances, such as chemicals."); see also LEE
& LINDAHL, supra note 4, § 28:1 (stating that "[a]ccording to one
source, there are approximately 5,000,000 organic chemicals and
500,000 inorganic substances used today, with another 10,000 new
chemicals synthesized in the research labs each year, of which 1,000
enter commerce.").
10. See CETRULO, supra note 4, at iii (claiming "[t]he evolving
law of toxic torts has been and will continue to be at the forefront of
the phenomenon of industry-wide litigation.").
11. See Martin v. Reynolds Metals Co. 342 P.2d 790, 793 (Or.
Sup. Ct. 1959). In recognizing the claim of trespass from invisible
fluoride compounds released by defendant's aluminum reduction
plant, the court stated, "[it is quite possible that in an earlier day
when science had not yet peered into the molecular and atomic
world of small particles, the courts could not fit an invasion through
unseen physical instrumentalities into the requirement that a trespass
can result only from direct invasion. But in the atomic age even the
undereducated know the great and awful force contained in the atom
and what it can do...." Id.
12. See CETRULO, supra note 4, § 2:1, at 2-2 (claiming "The as-
sertion of 'non-traditional' theories of liability and damages has re-
sulted in profound changes in the practice of tort and warranty-based
personal-injury litigation and has produced a large volume of case
law with marked jurisdictional differences....").
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cludes state and federal common law principles,' 3 state statutory
laws and some federal statutes. 14 The variety of causes of action,
legal principles, available damages, venue and jurisdictional issues
make it impossible to find universal rules that can apply to all factual
situations in every jurisdiction. An analysis of toxic torts is there-
fore inherently difficult due to the lack of nationwide uniformity in
answering the question of what is, and what is not, a "toxic tort."
This unpredictability is a natural outgrowth of our federal system,
which allows each state to develop its own legal principles, subject
to the minimal guarantees of the federal constitution.
B. Toxic Torts: Causes of Action
The typical toxic tort case involves one or more fairly traditional
cause of action: negligence, nuisance, trespass and strict liability.
While some cases may involve more novel theories including breach
of warranty, failure to warn and design defect, these are much less
common and rarely represent the core issues which drive the deci-
sion in the type of toxic tort cases we are examining in this article.
Negligence is the most commonly pled cause of action in toxic tort
cases. 15 Negligence claims arise from conduct which is alleged to
"fall below the standard established by law for the protection of oth-
ers against unreasonable risk of harm.,' 6 In toxic tort cases where
negligence is alleged, the plaintiff must show by a preponderance of
the evidence1 7 the traditional negligence elements of 1) duty - estab-
13. See LEE & LINDAHL, supra note 4, at § 28:5.
14. Id. § 28:4 (citing the Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. §
6901-6992, as amended by the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C.A. § 6972 (1976); the Water Pollution Con-
trol Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1317, 1321, as amended in 1977; the Hazard-
ous Materials Transportation Act, 42 U.S.C. § 170; 49 U.S.C. § 1471
et seq.; the Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2601-2692;
the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and
Liability Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. § 9601-9675; the Federal Hazard-
ous Substances Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1261-1278; the Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. § 136; and the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-399).
15. See CETRULO, supra note 4, § 2:2, at 2-3.
16. Id.
17. Id.
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lishing the relevant standard of care; 2) breach of duty; 3) proximate
cause; and 4) damages.18 Because of the complex nature of toxic
tort cases, the establishment of all the elements of negligence is often
difficult for a plaintiff. Consequently, negligence is, in some ways,
the traditional tort theory that plaintiffs least prefer.. 19 However, it is
in the context of a negligence claim that the plaintiff is able to ex-
pose the defendant's conduct to the jury, often revealing a shocking
lack of concern, on the part of the defendant, for the welfare of the
community living closest to the source of the toxic release.2 °
Negligence per se may apply when the claim is based on behavior
that falls below the minimal standard of conduct required by statutes
or regulations. 21 A negligence per se claim must establish:
1) [t]he existence of a statute or ordinance; 2) [t]hat the
statute or ordinance was intended to protect the class of
persons which includes the party; 3) [t]hat the protection
is directed toward the type of harm which has in fact oc-
curred as a result of a violation; and 4) [t]hat the violation
18. Id.; see also Elam v. Alcolac Inc., 765 S.W.2d 42, 204 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1988).
19. See Elam, 765 S.W.2d at 174 (claiming "thus, the logical
model of a single definable cause and a direct, immediate and ob-
servable [and hence, determinate] effect that suffices to prove cause
in fact in the traditional tort cause of action does not suit the toxic
tort explanandum").
20. See, e.g., Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795
(Cal. 1993), a successful negligence case brought against Firestone
Tire and Rubber Co., for improperly disposing of hazardous waste at
a nearby landfill. Through the litigation plaintiffs, who were nearby
residents of the landfill and exposed to contaminants through their
drinking water, discovered that Firestone was the source of the con-
tamination from hazardous waste that it disposed of at a nearby land-
fill. The landfill was neither adequately permitted nor designed for
accepting such wastes and although Firestone knew of the condition
and had made assurances to the disposal company that it would not
dispose of toxic liquid wastes at the facility, the company disguised
the waste in containers and sent them for disposal because the meas-
ure, it was thought, would save the company money.
21. See CETRULO, supra note 4, at § 2:4, at 2-7.
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of the ordinance or statute was a proximate cause of the
injury complained of." 22
In strict liability there is no need to prove fault of the defendant.23
A succinct description of strict liability can be found in the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts. Under the Restatement, strict liability can
be imposed in two situations: 24 abnormally dangerous activities
25
and products liability.26 In either case, the imposition of strict liabil-
ity makes it easier for a plaintiff to prove their case and be compen-
sated for their injuries. This is especially true in toxic tort cases
where the nature of the injuries and the hazardous properties of sub-
stances and products may be particularly suited for use of strict li-
ability theories..
For the theory of strict liability for abnormally dangerous activi-
ties, the Restatement provides that, "[o]ne who carries on an abnor-
mally dangerous activity is subject to liability for harm to the person,
land or chattels of another resulting from the activity, although he
22. Id.
23. Id. § 2:6; see, e.g., Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 647 F.
Supp. 303, 306 (W.D. Tenn. 1986). In Sterling the plaintiffs "argued
Velsicol should be held responsible for damages, without regard to
fault, on the theory of strict liability." Id.
24. See CETRULO, supra note 4, at § 2:6 (claiming that "[t]he term
'strict liability' actually encompasses two separate tort theories.").
25. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, §§ 519, 520 (1979).
26. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. §§ 1, 2
(1998). The concept of strict products liability originally provided in
section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts has most recently
changed and comments to the changes indicate that "'strict products
liability' is a term of art that reflects the judgment that products li-
ability is a discrete area of tort law which borrows from both negli-
gence and warranty. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (1979).
It is not fully congruent with classical tort or contract law. Rather
than perpetuating confusion spawned by existing doctrinal catego-
ries, §§ 1 and 2 define the liability for each form of defect in terms
directly addressing the various kinds of defects. As long as these
functional criteria are met, courts may utilize the terminology of
negligence, strict liability, or the implied warranty of merchantabil-
ity, or simply define liability in the terms set forth in the black let-
ter." See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 1 cmt. a
(1998).
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has exercised the utmost care to prevent the harm.",27 Additionally,
"[t]his strict liability is limited to the kind of harm, the possibility of
which makes the activity abnormally dangerous. ' 28 To determine
whether an activity is abnormally dangerous, section 520 provides
guidance for its implementation. Section 520 provides several fac-
tors to consider, which include:
(a) existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the
person, land or chattels of others;
(b) likelihood that the harm that results from it will be
great;
(c) inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of rea-
sonable care;
(d) extent to which the activity is not a matter of common
usage;
(e) inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it
is carried on; and
(f) extent to which its value to the community is out-
weighed by its dangerous attributes. 29
Nuisance and trespass are causes of actions available to plaintiffs
whose property has been damaged by hazardous substances. Such
claims can include personal injury suffered as a result of the invasion
of the property or property interest of the plaintiff. These are also
strict liability torts and do not require a showing of negligence. A
nuisance is a "harm, injury, inconvenience or annoyance. A nui-
sance claim alleges either interference with the use and enjoyment of
one's property, a private nuisance,3' or interference with public
rights under a public nuisance theory.32 In this way, nuisance torts
are categorized into either public or private claims. Although the
two claims are different, there can be substantial overlap when a
27. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519(1) (1979).
28. Id. § 519(2).
29. Id. § 520.
30. State v. Schenectady Chems., Inc., 459 N.Y.S.2d 971 (N.Y.
1983) (citing Copart Indus. v. Consol. Edison Co., 362 N.E.2d 968
(N.Y. 1977)).
31. See DOMINICK VETRI, TORT LAW AND PRACTICE, § 9.02, at
902 (2nd ed. 2002).
32. See id.
33. See id.
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public nuisance also interferes with a private right to use and enjoy
one's land.34
Private nuisances are "a nontrespassory invasion of another's in-
terest in the private use and enjoyment of land."3 5 In a private nui-
sance action:
liability [extends] only to those who have property rights
and privileges in respect to the use and enjoyment of the
land affected, including (a) possessors of the land, (b)
owners of easements and profits in the land, and (c) own-
ers of nonpossessory estates in the land that are detrimen-
tally affected by interferences with its use and enjoy-
ment.
36
Additionally, "[tlhere is liability for a nuisance only to those to
whom it causes significant harm, of a kind that would be suffered by
a normal person in the community or by property in normal condi-
tion and used for a normal purpose."
37
Public nuisances are "an unreasonable interference with a right
common to the general public." 38 Some examples of public nui-
sances include instances where:
the conduct involves a significant interference with the
public health, the public safety, the public peace, the pub-
lic comfort or the public convenience, or [where] the
conduct is proscribed by a statute, ordinance or adminis-
trative regulation, or [where] the conduct is of a continu-
ing nature or has produced a permanent or long-lasting
effect, and, as the actor knows or has reason to know, has
a significant effect upon the public right.39
Depending on the circumstances of a particular case, public nui-
sances can be brought by either private citizens4° or by a state's at-
torney general.41
34. See id.
35. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821D (1979).
36. Id. § 821E.
37. Id. § 821F.
38. Id. § 821B(1).
39. Id., at § 821B(2).
40. See CETRULO, supra note 4, at § 2:19. "A private action for
public nuisance is appropriate if the plaintiff suffers special damages
not suffered by the general public from the interference with the
public right." Id.
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Similar to, but distinctly different from nuisance, is the claim of
42trespass. Liability in trespass can occur:
irrespective of whether [a person] causes hann to any le-
gally protected interest of the other, if [that person] inten-
tionally (a) enters land in the possession of the other, or
causes a thing or a third person to do so, or (b) remains
on the land, or (c) fails to remove from the land a thing
which he is under a duty to remove. 43
A trespass claim alleges "the interference with the exclusive right
of possession of another."44
Trespass is a form of strict liability because it does not require the
elements of fault or willfulness.45 Trespass has evolved over the
years to include situations where hazardous or noxious substances
are found to have physically contacted another's real property. 46
Trespass in the toxic torts world is significantly different from tradi-
tional trespass claims because the physical invasion is often invisible
to the naked eye.47
Irrespective of the nature of the cause of action alleged, at root all
toxic tort cases require the same basic evidence. A toxic substance
must be released from some product or property, the plaintiff and/or
his property must be exposed to the toxic substance in some way,
and that exposure must be a substantial cause of a present injury
which plaintiff has suffered for which damages are recoverable. Of
all these elements the two which have proven the most troublesome
are exposure and causation.
41. See id. (stating "[p]ublic nuisance falls into the category of
minor criminal offenses and normally can be prosecuted only by the
government.").
42. At common law what is now called a nuisance was known as
"trespass on the case."
43. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 158 (1979).
44. See VETRI, supra note 31, at § 9.01, at 899.
45. See id.
46. See, e.g., Martin v. Reynolds Metals Co., 342 P.2d 790
(1959).
47. See id.
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II. IMPEDIMENTS To SUCCESSFUL Toxic TORT LITIGATION
It is a wonder that the toxic tort system stirs such animosity among
defendants when the hurdles plaintiffs must overcome to recover for
their injuries are so significant. Exposure and causation are espe-
cially difficult to prove in the types of toxic torts discussed in this
article. Among the reasons for this difficulty are the long latency
periods between exposure and the manifestation of injury; lack of
monitoring and health tracking that could yield data useful in prov-
ing causation; the Supreme Court's recent rulings on the admissibil-
ity of expert testimony; and statutes of limitations.
There is often a significant time lag between toxic exposure and
the time when symptoms become manifest. This latency period
makes the exposure analysis inherently difficult because it necessar-
ily requires reconstructing events over long periods of time. This
reconstruction process is made more difficult by the fact that the per-
sons responsible for the toxic releases often do not keep a record of
their releases. Even today, when more comprehensive monitoring is
required, the level of monitoring still falls far short of the kind of
individualized exposure information often needed by plaintiffs in
this kind of litigation. Rather, exposures are estimated using estab-
lished techniques for reconstructing past exposures from current
available information. This is an expensive process and, although
the techniques for conducting such analyses are well accepted
among engineers and government agencies, they are sometimes not
so convincing to the factfinder.
Medical causation is even more difficult to prove. As noted at the
outset of this article, the toxic tort cases under discussion are those
where the adverse health outcome is not uniquely related to the toxic
substance exposure. Thus, there are many possible causes of the
adverse health effect experienced by the plaintiff, and it is difficult to
directly implicate the toxic substance involved. A common defense
is therefore, that the plaintiff has not demonstrated that the exposure
was a cause, much less the cause, of the adverse health effect be-
cause there is no evidence that a greater majority of those exposed
have experienced the adverse health effect than would have absent
such exposure. This line of argument presents the ethical and evi-
dentiary quandary of having to wait for a "statistically significant"
number of people to show injury.
Responding to this need for statistical significance is made more
difficult by the fact that many of the adverse health outcomes associ-
ated with exposure to toxic substances, such as auto-immune dis-
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ease, neuro-toxic defects, immune system deficiencies and the like
are not routinely tracked by health professionals. It is thus difficult
to establish an incidence rate for these diseases, to which the inci-
dence in the exposed population can be compared. Even for diseases
for which records are kept, such as cancer or birth defects, the legal
system presents problems. An inherent ethical problem exists in the
legal system requirement that enough people to affect an epidemiol-
ogical study suffer a severe injury from an exposure before any ac-
tion can be taken to compensate victims of such exposure and to dis-
courage the continued use of the toxic substance or product. Ad-
dressing this very concern, a federal court held:
Product liability law, especially as it relates to relatively
new products or those with a relatively rare yet signifi-
cant danger, would be rendered next to meaningless if a
plaintiff could prove he was injured by a product only af-
ter a "statistically significant" number of other people
were also injured. A civilized legal system does not re-
quire that much human sacrifice before it can intervene.48
Nonetheless, even where courts adopt this more enlightened rea-
soning, the task of marshaling the available scientific literature and
demonstrating that it is more probable than not that an exposure to a
toxic substance was one of the causes of a plaintiffs illness is both
daunting and expensive.
In 1993 the Supreme Court raised yet another hurdle in the path of
the toxic-tort plaintiff when it held in Daubert v. Merrell Dow 49 that
federal district court judges must act as "gatekeepers" of all scien-
tific expert testimony and assure that the testimony is both relevant
and scientifically reliable. The Court was quite explicit in its direc-
tion to federal judges that "[i]n a case involving scientific evidence,
evidentiary reliability will be based upon scientific validity."5 ° This
directive was reiterated a few years later in Kumho Tire v. Carmi-
chae 51 in which the Supreme Court not only extended the "gate-
keeping" obligation to all expert opinions, not just scientific opinion,
48. Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 552 F. Supp. 1293, 1301
(D.C. 1982), aff 'd, 736 F.2d 1529 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
1062 (1984).
49. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
50. Id. at 590 n.9 (emphasis in original).
51. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
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but clearly instructed the federal judiciary not to create its own sci-
entific or technical standards.
The objective of that [Daubert] requirement is to ensure
the reliability and relevancy of expert testimony. It is to
make certain that an expert, whether basing testimony
upon professional studies or personal experience, em-
ploys in the courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor
that characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant
field.52
Notwithstanding these clear instructions, federal courts and some
state courts, which have adopted the federal interpretation of the
Daubert decision, have increasingly become embroiled in the scien-
tific and technical merits of the expert opinions offered in toxic tort
cases. Some have even openly declared that in their courtrooms,
regardless of the standards in the relevant field of the testifying ex-
pert, the expert must develop his opinion using a methodology of
which the court approves.
53
These departures from the proper scope of judicial scrutiny of ex-
pert opinion for purposes of admissibility have become so extreme
and widespread that scientists and legal scholars have raised objec-
tions. A recent study by a group of distinguished and independent
scientists concluded:
In the aftermath of Daubert, not only are many legitimate
scientists and their work being barred from the court-
room, but also plaintiffs are being denied their day in
court, unfairly in our view. Much of the evidence that
forms the basis of a plaintiff's case, from the safety of
drugs and consumer products to whether pollution has
caused harm, is based on science. In many cases, pre-
52. Id. at 152.
53. See Magistrini v. One-Hour Martinizing, 180 F. Supp. 2d 584,
at 604 n.25 (D. N.J. 2002), aff'd, 2003 WL 21467223 (3d Cir. June
25, 2003), reh'g petition pending (stating, "[t]here must be some
objective way to put a value on what the study says or shows. To be
sure, even if some sciences don't require it, this Court does," the
District Court rejected the carefully formulated opinion of one of the
nation's most distinguished and well-recognized experts on the haz-
ards of perchloroethylene (a widely used dry-cleaning solvent) and
objected to the fact that he did not create a table which ranked each
relevant study.)) (emphasis added).
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trial "Daubert hearings" exclude so much of the evidence
upon which plaintiffs intend to rely that a given case can-
not proceed.
Other leading legal and scientific scholars have reached similar
conclusions.55
Another impediment to plaintiff's success in a toxic tort suit is that
in certain states, the statute of limitation runs from the date of expo-
sure without any discovery rule. Application of 42 U.S.C. § 9658,
which imposes a federal discovery rule on all cases involving re-
leases of hazardous substances from a facility (all terms of art as
defined in Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation
and Liability Act (CERCLA)56) will solve this problem for those
cases which meet the CERCLA definitions. 57 In cases that do not
meet the CERCLA definitions, the plaintiff faces the burden of hav-
ing to prove his case as a condition of filing it, and must scramble to
assemble the evidence necessary to prove his case as the statute of
limitations runs.
These hurdles in proving a toxic tort case have had at least two un-
desirable results. First, persons who have suffered less than catas-
trophic injuries are unlikely to be fairly compensated through such
litigation because the cost of pursuing and proving their claim is
likely to exceed the potential recovery. Thus, these victims rarely
file claims. Second, in response to this problem, many potential
toxic exposure personal injury cases are turned into indiscriminate
54. Daubert: The Most Influential Supreme Court Ruling You've
Never Heard Of, PROJECT & SCI. KNOWLEDGE & PUB. POL'Y (Tellus
Institute), June 2003, at 3, available at http://www.defending
science.org/pdf/DaubertReport.pdf.
55. See, e.g. Jerome P. Kassirer & Joe S. Cecil, Inconsistency in
Evidentiary Standards for Medical Testimony: Disorder in the
Courts, 288 JAMA 1382, 1383-84 (2002) (finding that courts are
creating standards for expert testimony which exceed the standards
of the experts' professions and concluding "this practice is not faith-
ful to the mandate of the Supreme Court... [and] [c]ourts are being
misled if they think they are representing medical practice").
56. 42 U.S.C. § 9601.
57. See O'Connor v. Boeing N. Am., 311 F.3d 1139 (9th Cir.
2002) (discussing the two-prong test for application of the discovery
rule).
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mass or class action cases where all plaintiffs are lumped together. 58
The result may be a large total settlement recovery, where those
class members with the least injuries receive a high percentage of
their potential claim-and often more than they legitimately de-
serve-and those with the most serious injuries receive a much
smaller fraction of their real damages. This dilution of claims is in-
evitable once all persons exposed or potentially exposed are lumped
into a single mass or class action. The defendants will never settle
without getting a release from all claimants, even those with weak
claims, and the court will not approve the settlement without an as-
surance that all claimants will get some compensation. Although the
economic problems of a single injured person may be solved by fil-
ing a carefully crafted mass tort action representing only persons
with significant provable injuries, the substantial economic costs of
determining the viability of such a case remains an impediment to a
large number of legitimate claims.
In sum, persons who have been injured by exposure to a toxic sub-
stance or product, but whose injury is not manifest until many years
after the exposure, have substantial hurdles to overcome in order to
prevail in court. It is perhaps a measure of the extent to which toxic
exposures have occurred and the extent to which such claims could
be made that, notwithstanding these considerable barriers, defen-
dants continue to fight to make it even more difficult for the toxic
tort plaintiff to prevail. Since that fight is premised on the argument
that toxic tort litigation is misused by undeserving plaintiffs and,
moreover, fails to effectively deter those whose activities may ex-
58. A mass action is where numerous individual plaintiffs have
their individual claims filed as part of a single case. A class action is
where several people deemed representative of a much larger class
of people, file suit on their behalf and on behalf of all others simi-
larly situated. In the latter case there are several steps required to
obtain court approval of the class action format but in practice class
actions and mass actions may be pursued similarly. In both types of
case a group of representative plaintiffs may be selected to have their
cases pursued through discovery and trial with the results of the trial
resolving some, but usually not all, of the issues in dispute. Most
such cases never reach trial but are resolved either on pre-trial mo-
tions by defendants or, if that fails, by a global settlement for all
plaintiffs.
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pose others to toxic substances or products, we turn now to those
two questions.
III. Toxic TORT LITIGATION AND VICTIM COMPENSATION
A. How Well does Toxic Tort Litigation Compensate
Exposure Victims?
The difficulties built into toxic tort litigation also affect how well
toxic tort litigation compensates victims. Plaintiffs face huge hur-
dles in proving exposure and causation when the toxics involved
have long latency periods. The Supreme Court has made it more
difficult for plaintiffs to get expert testimony in front of the fact-
finder, and short statutes of limitations further complicate the plain-
tiff's task. Despite these impediments, toxic tort litigation fills some
of the gaps in other compensation programs. Moreover, as is dis-
cussed in this section, lawsuits can better compensate victims of
toxic exposure than the alternatives proposed by critics. As will be
discussed in the following section, toxic tort litigation plays a fun-
damental role in preventing future harms. But before addressing
these strengths of the toxic tort system, we address the concerns
raised by both plaintiffs and defendants regarding inequities in dam-
age awards, bankruptcy and transaction costs.
Critics of toxic tort litigation have focused on its perceived failure
at providing equitable compensation to victims. The civil justice
system does not compensate every deserving plaintiff, and due to
differences between juries, particularly among different regions of
the country, similar injuries may yield recoveries that vary dramati-
cally. But these variations are inherent in any dispersed system such
as ours, and also reflect the diversity in attitudes among different
parts of the country.
Critics also note that, under the current system, those who sue first
among a large group of injured persons sometimes get recoveries
large enough to force the defendant companies into bankruptcy.
When this happens subsequent plaintiffs, who sue later due to the
later development of their injuries from prior exposures, may not get
full compensation or, in some instances, any recovery at all. Bank-
ruptcy plays a significant role in toxic tort litigation. Its role is so
significant that some critics argue that "bankruptcy limits the ability
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of any liability system to actually implement the damage awards
required by [tort] theory." 59 Filing for bankruptcy allows a company
facing significant but also unresolved obligations from tort liability
to limit that liability with certainty and finality.
60
Critics claim that a closer look at bankruptcy reveals how it clashes
with the tort system and how it may be the stronger of the two.
6 1
Under Chapter 76 2 of the bankruptcy code, the debtor's assets are
distributed equitably to existing creditors. 63 A Chapter 7 filing re-
sults in the dissolution of the corporation and the discharge of all
creditor claims, which includes tort claims both known and unknown
at the time of bankruptcy.
64
Current tort claimants suffer in Chapter 7 liquidation because in
that process the assets of the firm are distributed to all creditors, but
only plaintiffs who have already won judgments are included in this
distribution. Further, even among the tort claimants included as
creditors, full recovery of their claim is unlikely. Future tort claim-
ants suffer even more in Chapter 7 liquidation because liquidation
dissolves the business entity and completely distributes its assets,
leaving nothing for future tort claimants to claim against. On the
other hand, the tort victim may take some solace in knowing that the
corporation that destroyed his life has itself been destroyed in bank-
ruptcy.
59. T. Randolph Beard, Bankruptcy and Care Choice, 21 RAND
J. ECON. 626 (1990).
60. CETRULO, supra note 4, at § 9:1.
61. See Lonnie T. Kishiyama, Countering Corporate Evasion of
Environmental Obligations Through Bankruptcy, VT. J. OF THE
ENVT. (2003), at http://www.vje.org/roscoe/roscoe03.html (claiming
that "[t]he primary conflict between environmental laws .... and the
Bankruptcy Act lies in their competing objectives." This principle is
also the same in the context of tort liability and bankruptcy, where
tort imposes liability which directly conflicts with "the goal of the
Bankruptcy Act to allow debtors to reorganize for a "fresh start" by
relieving them of liability." (citing James D. Barnette, The Treatment
of Environmental Matters in Bankruptcy Cases, 11 BANK. DEV. J.
85, 87 (1994/1995)).
62. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 701 (1985).
63. Id.
64. See CETRULO, supra note 4, at § 9:2.
2004] 209
210 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LA W REVIEW
Chapter 1165 reorganization is a much different process with dif-
ferent goals from those of Chapter 7 liquidation. Under Chapter 11,
also known as a "fresh start" or "clean slate," the goal is to help re-
habilitate a business entity by allowing it to continue as a going con-
cern, free from the pressures of pre-existing debt, while also treating
creditors equitably. 6 The goals may be different but, like Chapter 7,
Chapter 11 also impedes victims' full recovery by making it more
difficult to sue the reorganized entity. Claimants with a secured
judgment may ultimately be awarded only a small portion of their
damages after other creditors with higher priority under bankruptcy
law have been paid.
The stake of future plaintiffs, those who did not file a claim prior
to the company's bankruptcy, is very uncertain under Chapter 11.
Nonetheless, a future claimant fares much better when seeking re-
covery from a Chapter 11 reorganized entity than under a Chapter 7
liquidation because there is at least a small chance of recovery of a
small portion of their damages. Under Chapter 11, future claims can
be handled in one of two ways. A bankruptcy judge may appoint a
representative for future claims, and set aside some assets in a bank-
ruptcy trust from which those plaintiffs can recover. 67 Alternatively,
the bankruptcy judge may permit future claims to be asserted di-
rectly against the reorganized entity. This latter option is not com-
monly taken, because it conflicts with the idea of caping liability to
ensure the survival of the entity after reorganization.
The automatic stay mechanism under 11 U.S.C. § 362 affects toxic
tort cases on several levels. Once invoked, the stay prevents tort
cases from being brought or from proceeding further if they are ac-
tive, and prevents collection on judgments already issued.6 9 The stay
can benefit some toxic tort claimants because it prevents the distribu-
tion of the bankrupt corporation's assets to other creditors or previ-
65. See 11 U.S.C. § 1101 (1985).
66. See CETRULO, supra note 4, at § 9:4.
67. See Kaighn Smith, Jr., Beyond The Equity Power of Bank-
ruptcy Courts: Toxic Tort Liabilities In Chapter 11 Cases, 38 ME. L.
REv. 391, 395-400 (1986).
68. Id. at 400-05.
69. See CETRULO, supra note 4, at § 9:4.
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ous judgment holders, preserving those assets so that plaintiffs who
previously filed might be compensated.7 °
Once a bankruptcy petition is filed and the automatic stay begins,
the authority and jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court is expansive
and often limits full recovery for toxic tort claimants. The bank-
ruptcy court has the authority to
relieve a debtor from tort liability by: 1) bringing all tort
claims against the debtor, no matter where filed, under
the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court; 2) allowing the
court to estimate the value of unproven claims; and 3)
permitting the court to discharge all pending tort claims
as part of the settlement of the bankrupt estate., 71 Addi-
tional powers of the court which can impede recovery for
toxic tort litigants are: "the power to appoint legal repre-
sentatives for future claimants; 72 the power to bar all pu-
nitive damages claims against the debtor's estate;73 the
power to enjoin future suits against other entities other
than the debtor if those suits will impede the reorganiza-
tion process; 74 the power to dispose of property free and
clear of third party interests and to channel claims to the
70. See, S. ELIZABETH GIBSON, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CTR., CASE
STUDIES OF MASS TORT LIMITED FUND CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENTS
& BANKRUPTCY REORGANIZATIONS 5 (2000) (claiming that bank-
ruptcy treats tort plaintiffs more equitably than limited fund class
action settlements exactly because the court must figure out how to
settle the bankrupt's obligations to plaintiffs and other debtors.),
available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdfinsf/lookup/MassTort.
pdf/%24file/MassTort.pdf.
71. See CETRULO, supra note 4, at § 9:1 (citing 11 U.S.C. 502(a),
727(a) (1985)).
72. See CETRULO, supra note 4, at § 9:3 (citing In re A.H. Robins
Co, Inc., 880 F.2d 694 (4th Cir. 1989)).
73. CETRULO, supra note 4, at § 9:3 (citing Matter of GAC Corp.,
681 F.2d 1295 (11th Cir. 1982)).
74. CETRULO, supra note 4, at § 9:3 (citing In re Johns-Manville
Corp., 801 F.2d 60 (2nd Cir. 1986)).
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proceeds of settlement funds;75 and the power to retain
jurisdiction over funds set up in reorganization plans." 76
These broad powers of the bankruptcy court to control the out-
comes of not only current but also future toxic tort claims make
bankruptcy a significant concept in the recovery process for toxic
tort injuries.
The claim is also made that toxic tort litigation is unable ade-
quately to compensate all deserving victims because transaction
costs - i.e. the cost of litigation - often exceed the recoveries. Thus,
it is argued, since victims get so little of the money that such litiga-
tion generates, the system should be abandoned. This argument usu-
ally unfairly includes plaintiffs' attorneys' fees in the calculation of
transaction costs. The cost of an attorney to pursue the plaintiffs'
claim is no more a transaction cost than the cost of the medical
treatment the plaintiff had to undergo. Both are expenses necessi-
tated by the defendant's conduct. If the defendant were to offer to
fairly resolve the problems caused by his release of toxic substances,
the plaintiff would have no need to retain counsel to represent him in
such negotiations.
In recent years some defendants, mindful of the fact that bad things
can happen to good companies, have been pro-active in responding
to toxic releases by immediately offering compensation to third par-
ties who have been affected by the release of a toxic substance.
While these offers have not included compensation for persons with
latent injuries caused by toxic exposures, they have demonstrated
that if the defendant steps forward early in the process its conduct
can reduce the plaintiffs' transaction costs. Thus, the real focus of
transaction costs should be on the defendant who directly incurs
costs in resisting the claims and thereby compels the plaintiffs to
incur substantial costs.
Empirical evidence showing how well the toxic tort system is
compensating victims is hard to come by. The findings of one
RAND study, conducted in 1987, are frequently cited.77 The study
presents calculations of litigation costs and compensation in the tort
75. CETRULO, supra note 4, at § 9:3 (citing Kane v Johns-
Manville Corp., 843 F2d 636 (2nd Cir. 1988)).
76. CETRULO, supra note 4, at § 9:3 (citing MacArthur Co. v
Johns-Manville Corp., 837 F.2d 89 (2d Cir. 1988)).
77. Deborah R. Hensler, Trends in Tort Litigation: Findings from
the Institute for Civil Justice Research, 48 OHIO ST. L.J., 479 (1987).
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system in general and toxic tort cases in particular. Significantly, the
author found it "difficult to make any judgment about these costs
without having some comparable data for other systems of compen-
sation and deterrence and without having better data on how well
that tort system itself satisfies its compensation and deterrence func-
tion - none of which is currently available." 78 In comparing the
available data, the study found that "in asbestos worker injury litiga-
tion, plaintiffs receive about 37%" of total expenditures in net com-
pensation, a low figure the study attributes to higher transaction
costs associated with toxic tort cases. 79 This statistic is frequently
cited by critics of toxic tort litigation. What is ignored is that about
half of the other 63 percent of transaction costs are attributable to the
defense of the litigation by asbestos companies and their insurance
carriers.
The history of asbestos litigation is a lesson in the costs of intran-
sigence. In the early days of asbestos litigation, like the early days
of tobacco litigation, defendants successfully resisted claims. Even
after it became obvious to the world that both asbestos and tobacco
claims had merit, defendants continued to resist the claims. That
intransigence is the principal cause of the high transaction costs and
not the toxic tort litigation system.
78. Id. at 492.
79. What is also ignored is that while the large number of asbestos
law suits has become a lightning rod for critics of toxic torts (cases
have grown from 20,000 in 1982 to 200,000 in 2003 according to the
Statement of Dennis Archer, then President-Elect of the ABA during
Congressional Hearings on March 5, 2003), the larger number of
asbestos victims should be the focus of public policy concern. With
the notable exception of tobacco, no single toxic substance has killed
or maimed as many Americans as asbestos and unlike smokers, no
one claims that asbestos victims voluntarily accepted the risks asso-
ciated with asbestos exposure. Nonetheless, the political climate has
been so poisoned by asbestos companies, insurance companies and
tort "reformers" that this year Congress is likely to pass legislation to
nationalize all asbestos litigation and create a single compensation
system for all asbestos claims. It is hard to see how advocates of
free enterprise can call this a victory and difficult to imagine a simi-
lar compensation system will be pressed for victims of all other toxic
exposures. For those victims, tort "reform" with reduced recoveries
and higher costs for the victims is the remedy of choice.
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B. Remedies Suggested by the Critics
Critics are quick to point to problems with toxic tort litigation,
even arguing the system is unfair to claimants. These arguments are,
at best, disingenuous, since the "solutions" offered by these critics
demonstrate no concern for the welfare of those who have legitimate
claims, and most often seem designed to either restrict compensation
to the victims or deprive their lawyers of their fairly negotiated fees.
As already noted, there is no point in comparing the effectiveness of
toxic tort litigation as a means to compensate victims against some
hypothetical "perfect" system that no critic has yet to propose.
The reason critics are not proposing a "better" system is that most
proposals argue simply for dismantling the current system. The
United States does not have a single system for compensating vic-
tims, 80 but combines several different methods, systems and pro-
grams to provide compensation. 81 Those institutions include public
and private insurance as well as tort liability in a patchwork of safety
nets.82 This patchwork provides "a collection of different compensa-
tion programs, with gaps between and overlaps among them, leaving
many victims uncompensated and some actually over-
compensated. 83
If toxic tort liability is ripped from the safety net, what would this
leave for victims of exposure to toxic substances? Absent the civil
justice system, a victim of toxic exposure has very limited relief
available. Rarely will it have been possible for the persons directly
injured to carry insurance that could have protected them from the
adverse effects of the exposure. Even health insurance, which does
not cover many Americans who due to their economic condition end
up living or working in places where toxic exposure is more likely,
84
80. See Kenneth S. Abraham & Lance Liebman, Private Insur-
ance, Social Insurance, and Tort Reform: Toward a New Vision of
Compensation for Illness and Injury, 93 COLUM. L. REv. 75 (1993).
81. Id.
82. See id. at 76.
83. See id. at 78.
84. See RICHARD HOFRICHTER, ToxIc STRUGGLES: THE THEORY
AND PRACTICE OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 2 (Richard Hofrichter
ed., 2d ed. 2002) (claiming "[t]he uneven distribution of resources
and development that characterizes U.S. society finds a strong paral-
lel in the distribution of ecological hazards, particularly among under
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does not fully compensate those who do carry it. At most, medical
insurance only addresses medical costs and not lost wages, pain and
suffering and the loss of quality of life which toxic exposures may
cause. Unemployment compensation, disability compensation,
workers' compensation and similar worker-based risk sharing pro-
grams are woefully inadequate even for those who suffer an injury
from a workplace exposure. The compensation levels are too low,8 5
represented, disenfranchised populations - African Americans, La-
tino Americans, Native Americans, Asian Americans, the poor, and
women .... Not coincidentally, these same populations typically
receive inadequate public-health and social services and live in eco-
nomically underdeveloped areas with high unemployment.").
85. See Oscar S. Gray, Future Prospects For Compensation Sys-
tems, Introduction 52 MD. L. REV. 893, 894 (1993).
There is no fixed definition of "compensation" systems.
The term alludes generally to concepts for the replace-
ment of tort liability in certain contexts with a statutory
substitute. The pioneering model was workers' compen-
sation. Proposals along these lines usually share two
characteristics: their criteria for compensability do not
purport to require that culpability be found on the part of
the injurer, although culpability may have limited secon-
dary significance in the context of certain definitional is-
sues; and the measure of damages permitted is less than
that traditionally provided in tort, for example, by restric-
tions on the availability of damages for non-economic
losses, or perhaps, for losses for which payments are
available from collateral sources. The "compensation"
notion is broad enough to cover both "liability" (or
"third-person") and "nonliability" (or "first-person") sys-
tems, that is, both systems in which compensatory pay-
ments are made by or on behalf of injurers--for example,
workers' compensation - and those where the payments
are made by others, such as a state agency, or by the in-
jured person's own insurer, as in the case of "no-fault"
motoring insurance.
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often the benefits run out before the injured worker has recovered 86
and in the case of workers' compensation, the standard of proof re-
quired to qualify for compensation is often impossible to meet and
inconsistent with sound scientific principles.
87
In summary, without the toxic tort system there is no universal
health care program to cover victims' medical costs. If the toxic
exposure injury occurred someplace other than at work, there is no
mechanism to compensate the victim for lost wages. Finally, with-
out the toxic tort system, there is no relief for the drastic alteration in
the life of the victim - disability, pain, loss of the normal joys of life
and loss of companionship of loved ones.
86. See Martha T. McCluskey, The Illusion of Efficiency in Work-
ers' Compensation "Reform," 50 RUTGERs L. REv. 657, 698-700
(1998).
Even though many employers and insurers insisted that
benefit costs had reached crisis levels by the early 1990s,
labor groups and other representatives of injured workers
often argued that benefits remained insufficient to pre-
vent destitution and despair for many workers. Both
benefits and coverage have remained well below recom-
mendations for minimum adequacy set unanimously by
the 1972 National Commission, and progress toward
those goals has slowed since the early 1980s. In 1992,
maximum temporary disability benefits in about 40% of
U.S. jurisdictions were less than 100% of the average
weekly wage. In 1994, permanent total disability benefits
were not actually permanent but were limited by duration
or age in eleven states. A 1989 study by the RAND Insti-
tute for Civil Justice found that injured workers recovered
a lower percentage of their accident costs than all acci-
dent victims (54.1%), and that workers' compensation
only compensated about 30% of the costs of long-term
disabilities from work accidents. Injured workers often
face denials and delays of apparently legitimate claims,
high litigation costs, discrimination, and harassment by
employers and coworkers." (citations omitted.
Id.
87. See Smothers v. Gresham Transfer, Inc., 23 P.3d 333 (Or.
2001).
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IV. How WELL DOES Toxic TORT LITIGATION
DETER Toxic TORTS?
Toxic tort litigation should be evaluated as to whether it success-
fully shifts all the costs generated by a substance or product back
onto those who have benefited from its manufacture or use, and not
with regard to whether the risk shifting is involuntary, the recovery
is too high, or may result in the bankruptcy of the defendant. If the
real cost of producing or using a substance or product is so high
when properly allocated that no business can successfully survive,
the solution is not to force innocent parties to continue to absorb
those costs but to stop manufacturing or using the product and de-
velop a safer alternative. How could a civilized society reach a dif-
ferent conclusion?
The civil justice system in general and toxic tort litigation in par-
ticular complement the free market by allocating the risk of various
socially useful activities among those who create the risk and those
who consume the goods or services which create the risk. To further
explore this idea, it is important to first understand the concept of
risk.
A common definition of risk is "the chance of injury, damage, or
loss." 88 Black's Law Dictionary defines risk in general as "the ele-
ment of uncertainty in an undertaking. Risk may be moral, physical
or economic." 89 In modern society, a certain degree of risk is asso-
ciated with nearly everything we do (even doing nothing has a cer-
tain degree of risk to it). It must be remembered that "risk is not
entirely undesirable," 90 and that there are many ways to handle un-
desirable risks, including: insurance; "contracts that allocate risks
regarding future price, supply, and safety of goods and services; ...
diversify[ing] investments; ... spend[ing] money on safety; and...
engag[ing] in any number of other actions that manage risk."91
Risk can also be understood as "the probability that a person will
experience an adverse effect from some activity or exposure. [And]
88. WEBSTER'S NEW TWENTIETH CENTURY DICTIONARY OF THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE UNABRIDGED (2nd ed. 1969).
89. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979).
90. Kenneth Abraham, DISTRIBUTING RISK: INSURANCE, LEGAL
THEORY, AND PUBLIC POLICY 2 (Yale Univ. Press 1986).
91. Id.
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risk assessment is the process of quantifying and evaluating risk.
92
By quantifying and evaluating risk, a person or company can better
decide what course of action to follow. A toxic substance risk as-
sessment identifies an exposure hazard, the level of exposure likely
to occur, and the level of risk of injury from the estimated expo-
sure.9 3 Based on such an assessment, a company can take appropri-
ate steps to reduce risk. But, safety precautions are normally taken
"only to the extent that their benefits exceed the costs."94
Often there is a continuum of risk choices, such as allow-
able level of exposure to toxic chemicals. As long as the
incremental benefits of increased safety exceed the in-
cremental costs, more tightening of the regulation or the
imposition of liability on the firm is desirable. Regula-
tion or litigation is stringent, however, when firms are
pushed to enact measures whose incremental costs out-
weigh incremental benefits."
95
The common law has long recognized the principle of risk alloca-
tion and has, as suggested above, distinguished between those in-
jured by a substance or product who gain benefit from it and those
who do not. For example, warning labels in fulfillment of the manu-
facturer's duty to warn can insulate the manufacturer from suit by a
user of the product who suffers injury as a result of one of the risks
for which a warning has been given.96 But a third party, who neither
92. KENNETH R. FOSTER ET AL., PHANTOM RISK 2 (David Bern-
stein & Peter Huber eds. 1993).
93. Id. at 3.
94. W. Kip Viscusi, Overview, in REGULATION THROUGH
LITIGATION 4 (W. Kip Viscusi ed. 2002).
95. Id. at 4-5.
96. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2
(1998).
A product is defective when, at the time of sale or distribution, it
contains a manufacturing defect, is defective in design, or is defec-
tive because of inadequate instructions or warnings. A product: (c)
...is defective because of inadequate instructions or warnings when
the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have been
reduced or avoided by the provision of reasonable instructions or
warnings by the seller or other distributor, or a predecessor in the
commercial chain of distribution, and the omission of the instruc-
tions or warnings renders the product not reasonably safe.
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bought nor used the product but was injured by it, retains the right to
sue the manufacturer for the injury, regardless of the warning. 97
It is widely believed that risk allocation decisions made by a jury
are usually irrational and do not appropriately reallocate the cost of
injurious substances or products. Many believe that juries cannot
fully understand the complex issues that arise in many of these cases,
that juries are generally biased against corporate defendants and to-
wards the "little guy" plaintiffs, and that juries are swayed by the
passions that persuasive plaintiff trial lawyers can arouse.
Criticisms such as these are almost always supported, not by credi-
ble data, but by the most questionable of anecdotal evidence. The
annual "Stella Awards," named for the plaintiff in the McDonald's
coffee scalding case and purportedly "honoring" the "the most frivo-
Id.
97. See id. § 2 cmt. i.
Inadequate instructions or warnings. Commercial product sellers
must provide reasonable instructions and warnings about risks of
injury posed by products. Instructions inform persons how to use and
consume products safely. Warnings alert users and consumers to the
existence and nature of product risks so that they can prevent harm
either by appropriate conduct during use or consumption or by
choosing not to use or consume. In most instances the instructions
and warnings will originate with the manufacturer, but sellers down
the chain of distribution must warn when doing so is feasible and
reasonably necessary. In any event, sellers down the chain are liable
if the instructions and warnings provided by predecessors in the
chain are inadequate... . Depending on the circumstances, Subsec-
tion (c) may require that instructions and warnings be given not only
to purchasers, users, and consumers, but also to others who a rea-
sonable seller should know will be in a position to reduce or avoid
the risk of harm. There is no general rule as to whether one supply-
ing a product for the use of others through an intermediary has a
duty to warn the ultimate product user directly or may rely on the
intermediary to relay warnings. The standard is one of reasonable-
ness in the circumstances. Among the factors to be considered are
the gravity of the risks posed by the product, the likelihood that the
intermediary will convey the information to the ultimate user, and
the feasibility and effectiveness of giving a warning directly to the
user. (emphasis added).
Id.
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lous successful lawsuits in the United States," 98 exemplify how
much of the enthusiasm for tort reform has been driven by anec-
dotes, many of which, like many of the "Stella Award" honorees, are
mythical. 99 Thus, when questions are raised about the alleged inabil-
ity of juries to understand and decide issues of complex science, it is
important to look to available data and avoid anecdotes. A wealth of
empirical evidence supports the view that juries are excellent at re-
solving disputes, even complex disputes involving parties with
widely disparate resources. 10
Risk shifting is an essential part of the free enterprise system and is
common in contexts other than that of litigation. For example, in-
surance companies help people spread risks by charging premiums
to certain groups, who then spread or share the risk of injury among
98. See Stella Awards, ebaumsworld.com, at http://www.
ebaumsworld.com/stella.shtml (last visited Mar. 1, 2004).
99. See Tortious Reform, snopes.com, at http://www.snopes.
com/legal/lawsuits.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2004).
100. See, e.g., STEPHEN DANIELS & JOANNE MARTIN, CIVIL JURIES
AND THE POLITICS OF REFORM (1995); NORMAN J. FINKEL,
COMMONSENSE JUSTICE: JURORS' NOTIONS OF THE LAW (1995);
SAUL KASSIN & LAWRENCE WRIGHTSMAN, THE AMERICAN JURY ON
TRIAL (1988);VALERIE P. HANS & NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY
(1986); NEIL VIDMAR, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND THE AMERICAN
JURY: CONFRONTING THE MYTHS ABOUT JURY INCOMPETENCE, DEEP
POCKETS AND OUTRAGEOUS DAMAGE AWARDS (1995); Richard
Lempert, Civil Juries and Complex Cases: Taking Stock After
Twelve Years, in VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM 181
(Robert E. Litan ed., 1993); ROBERT MACCOUN, Inside the Black
Box: What Empirical Research Tells Us About Decision Making by
Civil Juries, in VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM 137
(Robert E. Litan ed., 1993); Joe Cecil et al., Citizen Comprehension
of Difficult Issues: Lessons from Civil Jury Trials, 40 AM. U.L.
REV. 727 (1991); Brian Ostrom et al., A Step Above Anecdote: A
Profile of the Civil Jury in the 1990s, 79 JUDICATURE 233 (1996);
Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, A Cognitive Theory of Juror De-
cision Making: The Story Model, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 519 (1991);
Neil Vidmar, The Performance of the American Civil Jury: An Em-
pirical Perspective, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. (1998); see generally Brief of
Amici Curiae leading jury scholars, Kuhmo Tire Co. v. Carmichael,
536 U.S. 127 (1999) (1998 WL 734434).
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themselves. When manufacturers buy liability insurance, the cost of
that insurance is added to the cost of the goods sold and thus passed
on to those who benefit from the product or substance. But impor-
tantly, as discussed above, these same alternative mechanisms rarely
provide full recovery to victims of toxic torts.
Insurance and other mechanisms for shifting risk are born of liabil-
ity. Without liability there would be no need to shift risks. These
mechanisms work reasonably well to soften and, in some cases, pro-
tect corporations from, liability. The problem is that without liabil-
ity, as in most trust fund and other government-run programs to pay
for injuries to innocent victims, these mechanisms fail to change the
behavior of the producers of toxic substances or products. This is
partly because the costs of these programs are known and are passed
onto the consumer. Consequently these more predictable forms of
shifting risk may fail to deter companies from continuing harmful
practices.
If one group enjoys the benefits while another absorbs the risks it
is unlikely that risk creators will see any need to reduce the risk, par-
ticularly if such risk reduction will diminish their benefit. Many
years ago Amory Lovins, in discussing the risks of nuclear power,
suggested that those who believed that it carried a risk of only one
death in ten million people should be required to imagine that the
one was their child. Even such a theoretically small risk would seem
very large from this new perspective. This shows why it is ex-
tremely important to try to the fullest extent possible to place the risk
of any conduct on the same person who benefits from the conduct so
they can better decide (1) whether the benefits exceed the risks and
(2) the extent to which taking steps to control the risks will be in-
crementally beneficial.
Thus, the issue in tort litigation is how can those who currently
bear the risk of the defendant's conduct shift their costs, and to
whom should those costs be shifted? Should it be the person for
whose benefit the toxic substance or product was produced, the per-
son who manufactured and sold the product, the general public
and/or any combination of these groups?
Through successful litigation, a toxic-exposure victim either com-
pels the manufacturer or user of the toxic substance or product to pay
the real economic cost of its production or use, or distributes that
cost among those who benefit from its manufacture or use. The
higher the awards and/or the more likely they are to be followed by
subsequent awards, the more likely the defendants will be to try to
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avoid further liability. In other words, risk shifting creates deter-
rence.
Even so, critics question whether litigation really deters the con-
duct which creates the toxic tort. They make several arguments.
First, they claim, "the imposition of liability in the long-latency toxic
tort cases that have increasingly become the focus of controversy
within the tort liability system is unlikely to achieve the goals of cor-
rective justice and optimal deterrence."' 0' 1 The critics claim that,
because of this time lag, the actual wrongdoers are probably not
around and are unlikely to be the ones who eventually pay the dam-
ages. ' 02 If tort sanctions are frequently not assessed against the prin-
cipally negligent actor until after they are gone, the threat of liability
is too weak to cause them to change their behavior. 0 3 Thus, critics
conclude, the latency and uncertainty associated with toxic tort cases
causes companies to undervalue the potential tort claims against
them, and therefore the threat of tort liability is not likely to deter
unsafe behavior.
Despite its convincing ring, this argument does not hold up. The
insurance companies who write general liability policies evidently
do not subscribe to it. They recognize that the risk of future claims
must be reflected in higher premiums; some have even begun includ-
ing "pollution exclusion" clauses in their policies to avoid paying for
toxic tort liability. For the companies themselves, while current
management may expect not to be held liable when their conduct
produces toxic tort litigation twenty years in the future, boards of
directors, shareholders, banks and others who have a longer view of
the health of the corporation are unlikely to tolerate management
creating financial time bombs by failing to be sensitive to the dan-
gers of using and disposing of toxic substances and products. " 4 In
101. Kenneth S. Abraham & Lance Liebman, Private Insurance,
Social Insurance, and Tort Reform: Toward a New Vision of Com-
pensation for Illness and Injury, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 75, 86-87
(1993).
102. See id. at 75, 87.
103. PETER A. BELL & JEFFREY O'CONNELL, ACCIDENTAL JUSTICE:
THE DILEMMAS OF TORT LAW 79 (Yale Univ. Press 1997).
104. See Richard B. Stewart, Crisis In Tort Law? The Institutional
Perspective, 54 UNIV. CHI. L. REV. 184, 193 (1987) (stating in the
context of discussing workers' comp that "[e]mployers have strong
incentives to manage workplace practices so as to reduce workers'
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addition, due diligence reviews, conducted as part of the pre-
purchase process for a corporation, routinely look at potential liabil-
ity. It is unlikely that a corporation's management would knowingly
create a problem that could torpedo any eventual sale of the com-
pany by ignoring future tort liability their current conduct might be
creating. In recent years better defense lawyers have begun to coun-
sel their clients on ways to select less dangerous chemicals and to
more safely handle and dispose of these chemicals.' 0 5 Government
regulations, many born out of toxic tort crises like Love Canal, also
create incentives for safer conduct.' 
06
A second argument says that because insurance spreads the risk
among many companies and puts a fixed and predictable cost on the
consequences of negligent handling of toxic substances and prod-
ucts, the threat of toxic tort litigation is an empty one, creating no
incentive for potential defendants to alter their behavior. 10 7 How-
ever, even these critics recognize that roughly one third of the com-
mercial market is self-insured, a fact which raises doubts as to
whether liability insurance actually undermines the deterrent effect
of toxic tort litigation, since self-insured companies are more likely
to be risk-averse than those insured through commercial plans.
0 8
Moreover, those companies with commercial insurance certainly
have incentives to try to improve safety and thereby lower their pre-
miums. 109 Finally, insurance companies have a long history, in areas
such as fire insurance and increasingly in the area of use and dis-
posal of toxics, of working with their potential clients to make sure
they meet certain standards of conduct before writing insurance to
cover certain liabilities.
contribution to risk. The riskier the job, the more an employer must
pay for workers' compensation liability insurance, and the higher the
wage he must offer to attract workers.").
105. Interviews and information from a few distinguished defense
lawyers, see infra note 120, are the basis for these observations. See
the conclusion infra for a further discussion.
106. See, e.g., Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 6901-6992 (1976) (enacted following the Love Canal disaster).
107. BELL & O'CONNEL, supra note 103, at 78.
108. Id. at 80.
109. Id.
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V. SOME POSSIBLE ALTERATIONS To Toxic TORT LITIGATION
THAT PRESERVE ITS GOALS
Although we find no persuasive argument that toxic tort litigation
should be limited, or access to the litigation option for toxic-
exposure victims should be narrowed, there are problems with the
current system. Some problems, like the difficulty of proving an
exposure alleged to have occurred at a time when no adequate moni-
toring existed and the difficulty of proving causation, are the result
of extra-legal factors. Other problems, like the prevalence of frivo-
lous lawsuits and high transaction costs, arise within the legal sys-
tem. What follows is a discussion of some possible solutions to
these problems.
A. Difficulty of Proving Exposure and Causation
If the law required companies that use and dispose of toxics to
conduct comprehensive monitoring of all individuals who might be
exposed to such toxins through accidental or planned releases, at the
very least future litigation based on exposures after implementation
of such a law would not have to rely upon expensive computerized
reconstructions of toxic exposures. Similarly, if the law mandated
that companies that manufacture, use and/or dispose of toxics create
a fund to be used by independent scientists, such as the Environ-
mental Protection Agency, National Academy of Sciences, the Na-
tional Institutes of Health, the Agency for Toxic Substances Disease
Registry and the National Institute for Occupational Safety and
Health, to conduct comprehensive retrospective exposure analyses
and epidemiologic studies of all the populations which have been
exposed, the doubt over who was exposed and which diseases were
caused by such exposure would be substantially reduced.
Changes could be made to the tort litigation system that could
make it easier for exposure victims to prove their case. Thus, for
example, the law could say that anyone exposed to a toxic substance
or product at a level exceeding some Environmental Protection
Agency baseline, 110 whose subsequent health problem has been
found, in any published, peer-reviewed study, to have a higher inci-
dence among those exposed to such substance, is presumed to have
110. For example, the level that the Agency has set for allowable
trichlorethylene contamination in drinking water, 5 parts per billion.
[VOL. XV
PRESERVING JUSTICE
suffered that adverse health effect as a result of such exposure. A
defendant could then attempt to rebut that presumption with what-
ever scientific evidence it could muster and the jury would decide
whether the defendant overcame the presumption. Another approach
could be to alter the legal standard for causation to be no more strin-
gent than the standard of scientific proof of safety of the substance or
product in force at the time of the original manufacture, use, disposal
or release of the toxic product or substance. This would eliminate
the need for evidence with the high level of scientific certainty that
courts often now demand in toxic tort cases.
Easing the plaintiff's burden in toxic tort litigation might have the
beneficial result of increasing the deterrent effect of the litigation
threat. The more likely a defendant is to lose such a case and the
larger the likely recovery from such litigation, the more incentive
companies will have to act to avoid such litigation. Such a policy
might over-deter. However, if the choice is between under-
deterrence and more toxic tort injuries on the one hand, and over-
deterrence and a margin of safety on the other, a strong argument
could be made in favor of the latter since there is no real social util-
ity to spreading the risk of any activity to others beyond those who
directly benefit from that activity. Over-deterrence would keep the
risk where it belongs.
It is important to note that, for such sweeping changes to be made,
our society would have to first make a policy decision. We would
have to decide that a looser system, that may mistakenly compensate
some whose injuries were not caused by toxic exposure, is better
than a system so "tight" as to risk denying compensation to some
who deserve it but have difficulty proving their cases.
B. Bankruptcy
Critics argue that current bankruptcy law impedes the full compen-
sation of plaintiffs severely enough to justify an overhaul of toxic
tort litigation. But surely it would be more appropriate, if the prob-
lem is as serious as some critics claim, to overhaul the bankruptcy
laws to give greater priority to persons exposed to toxic substances
and other innocent victims of corporate misconduct, since it is likely
that that misconduct contributed to the corporate profits that in turn
attracted the business creditors whose interests are currently given
priority. Such a shift in priority would create a substantial incentive
among those creditors to investigate the toxic substance use, han-
dling and disposal practices of a company before risking their
2004]
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money. In addition, if the corporation is going to pursue the less
draconian form of bankruptcy offered by Chapter 11, addressing the
claims of past and future victims of its corporate misdeeds is argua-
bly a fair price that the company should have to pay for corporate
survival. If it cannot pay that price, then Chapter 7 provides a proc-
ess which at least assures the innocent victims that the wrong-doer
paid the ultimate price for its actions.
Note that not just exposure victims, but shareholders, business
creditors and others who have participated in the business are also
less than fully compensated when a toxic-tort defendant company
chooses or is forced into bankruptcy. The shareholders and business
creditors often face the loss of at least some and sometimes all of
their investment. No one suggests that this is a reason to overhaul
the rules for investing in corporations, loaning them money or sell-
ing them goods or service on credit. It may, however, be yet another
indication that the toxic-tort litigation system does need reform.
C. Frivolous Claims
Critics complain that many toxic tort suits are essentially frivolous.
These cases, they argue, require substantial expenditure of resources
before they can be disposed of by summary judgment. Frivolous
claims thus drive up the cost of litigation for both sides. One oft-
proposed solution would be to require a plaintiff to demonstrate, as a
precondition to proceeding with the lawsuit, that he has a good faith
basis for his claim. Such an approach might be acceptable if modi-
fied as follows.
First, the plaintiff should not be required to prove anything which
depends to any substantial extent on information to which plaintiff
does not have access. Thus, if the release of the toxic substance is
known to have occurred but the level of that release is knowable
only by examining the operating records of defendant's facility, the
plaintiff should not be required to produce that information in order
to be able to pursue his claim.
Second, once the plaintiff meets an appropriate burden of produc-
tion, the defendant should have to produce similar evidence to sup-
port the bases asserted in its answer to the complaint, including its
affirmative defenses, or be prohibited from defending the litigation,
subject to the same caveat that it cannot be expected to prove any-
thing which is uniquely within the knowledge of the plaintiff.
Third, the problem of the statute of limitations will have to be ad-
dressed. As described above, in a few states, the statute of limitation
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runs from the date of exposure without any discovery rule. Applica-
tion of 42 U.S.C. § 9658, which imposes a federal discovery rule on
all cases involving releases of hazardous substances from a facility
(all terms of art as defined in CERCLA 1) will solve this problem
for those cases which meet the CERCLA definition and will effec-
tively preempt more conservative state laws, including less liberal
state discovery rules." However, even for cases that meet the
CERCLA definition and certainly for others, it would be wrong to
both require that plaintiffs be able to prove their case as a condition
of filing it and at the same time allow the statute of limitations to run
while the plaintiffs scramble to assemble the evidence necessary to
do so. This dilemma was recognized by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in a recent decision where it held:
we reject an interpretation of the federal discovery rule
that would commence limitations periods upon mere sus-
picion of the elements of a claim. Under the circum-
stances presented here, such a standard would result in
'the filing of preventative and often unnecessary claims,
lodged simply to forestall the running of the statute of
limitations.' McGraw v. United States, 281 F.3d 997,
1003 (9th Cir. 2002), amended by 298 F.3d 754 (9th Cir.
2002).113
One solution would be to allow a plaintiff to file a bare-bones
complaint that would toll the statute of limitations but would impose
no discovery or other obligations on the defendant until plaintiff had
met her burden of production. This could also be negotiated be-
tween plaintiff and defendant, with defendant waiving the statute of
limitations in exchange for a commitment from plaintiff to produce
its prima facie evidence on the key issue, for court review, prior to
pursuing the litigation.
Several proposals have been advanced to address the high transac-
tion costs of toxic tort litigation. Victims of toxic torts could cer-
tainly be better compensated at lower transaction costs if we were
prepared to create a compensation system to award damages on the
111. 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (1980).
112. See O'Connor v. Boeing N. Amer., 311 F.3d 1139, 1149 (9th
Cir. 2002) (finding that the Federal Discovery Rule, 42 U.S.C. §
9658, preempted California's discovery rule).
113. Id. at 1148 (quoting McGraw v. United States, 281 F.3d 997,
1003 (9th Cir. 2002), amended by 298 F.3d 754 (9th Cir. 2002)).
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basis of exposure and injuries linked to such exposure, recognizing
all medical costs, lost wages and (using the record of jury verdicts
over the years) critical intangibles such as pain and suffering and
loss of quality life. Such a "trust fund" proposal has been put for-
ward in Congress with regard to asbestos litigation and has some
support from members of both the defense and plaintiffs' bar." 4
However, this willingness of defendants and plaintiffs to come to-
gether on the asbestos issue does not represent widespread support
for an alternative to toxic tort litigation in general. Asbestos litiga-
tion is and always has been sui generis given the massive number of
plaintiffs and potential plaintiffs, the huge number of companies that
have been implicated and the decades of non-stop civil warfare that
has sapped the will-to-persevere of both plaintiffs and defendants.
Still, if such a system were implemented for other toxic tort claims,
attorneys' fees on both sides could be substantially reduced resulting
in greater compensation of plaintiffs.
Such a trust fund compensation scheme would have to include ma-
jor improvements over current workers' compensation systems,
black lung programs and uranium miner compensation programs
115
which have proven to be cumbersome, costly to administer, stingy
towards plaintiffs and burdened by many of the same problems of
proving exposure and causation as exist in current toxic tort litiga-
114. See The Asbestos Litigation Crisis Continues-Is It Time for
Congress To Act: Hearing Before the United States Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2003) (testimony of Dennis Archer,
President-elect, American Bar Association), available at
http://judiciary.senate.gov/print-testimony.cfm?id=617&witid 1677
(last visited March 4, 2004); see also Asbestos Litigation: Hearing
Before the United States Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th
Cong. (2003) (testimony of Frederick Baron, partner Baron and
Budd, P.C., ); and Asbestos Litigation: Hearing Before the United
States Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2002) (testi-
mony of Steven Kazan, Partner, Kazan, McClain, Edises, Abrams,
Fernandez, Lyons & Farrise).
115. See, e.g., Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act,
33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950; Federal Employees' Compensation Act, 5
U.S.C. § 8101-8193; Federal Black Lung Benefits Reform Act of
1977, 30 U.S.C. § 901 (1977); Energy Employees' Occupational
Illness Compensation Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7384-7385.
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tion.116 Even more importantly, as described above, most trust fund
compensation systems lack the deterrence and risk-shifting compo-
nents of litigation. These mechanisms treat all defendants similarly,
in that "good actors" usually pay the same taxes or fees into these
funds as the "bad actors." This means that fewer potential defen-
dants may opt to be "good actors" and pay for precautions not oth-
erwise required."17
D. Transaction Costs
Transaction costs are the unavoidable consequence of the ferocious
litigation that defendants undertake in most toxic tort cases. Some of
the controversy is inherent in the issues that surround toxic torts.
Reasonable minds can, and do, differ on issues of exposure and cau-
sation. But, the controversies go far beyond those core issues, and
consume millions of dollars of legal time and expert witnesses. De-
fendants have spent several millions of dollars in "goodwill" adver-
tising to soften up the jury pool for an anticipated trial.1 18 It is not
unusual for every possible legal strategy to be used by the defense
either in the hopes that one might succeed or, at a minimum, that
plaintiffs will lose their passion for the fight and be willing to settle
for much less than their original demands. These "take no prisoners"
116. See Smothers v. Gresham Transfer, Inc., 23 P.3d 333 (Or.
2001). In order to recover under Oregon's workers' compensation
law, a worker had to prove that exposure to a toxic substance at work
was the "major contributing cause" of his injury. Id. at 362. The
Oregon Supreme Court lifted the bar against civil litigation for
workers who were denied recovery on that basis. Id. The Oregon
legislature has now codified this principle. See OR. REV. STAT.
656.019 (2001).
117. One way to ameliorate this problem would be to base the pre-
miums paid into the fund on the record of compensation paid as a
result of the releases from the company. Thus, a company whose
releases caused payments to be made would have to pay a much lar-
ger premium than other companies. This free market incentive
should also be considered in setting premiums for medical malprac-
tice liability and other liability coverage.
118. See, e.g., Milo Geyelin, Going First Class - Soaring Legal
Expense: Motorola Bemoans It But Runs a Big Tab, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 5, 1994, at Al.
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tactics make toxic tort litigation much more expensive and risky for
plaintiffs and their counsel, thus requiring plaintiffs' counsel to keep
their fees high1 19 to compensate them for the enormous risks in-
volved in such litigation, If the defense were more measured, plain-
tiffs could reasonably expect that their attorneys' fees could at least
be adjusted based on how early in the litigation the case were re-
solved.
If defense attorneys worked on a contingent basis (as do the plain-
tiffs attorneys), receiving a percentage of the money they saved
their client as compared to their initial estimate of the real value of
the plaintiffs' case, the increased incentives for settlement of these
cases at a much earlier stage and at a much more equitable amount
would reduce the overall transaction costs significantly, resulting in
higher recoveries for the victims. A defendant with a realistic as-
sessment of the plaintiffs' case, freed of the false slogans about all
toxic tort claims being bogus, can reduce transaction costs enor-
mously by entering into early and serious settlement discussions.
Absent that unlikely revolution, transaction costs will remain high.
VI. CONCLUSION
As part of the preparation of this article we solicited the views of a
number of legal practitioners representing plaintiffs, defendants and
insurance companies. While the effort was decidedly un-scientific
we were hopeful that by choosing prominent lawyers in toxic tort
litigation we would at least get a flavor for the prevailing views.
Regrettably only four lawyers responded, all defense counsel. How-
ever, what they lacked in numbers was more than made up for by
their quality. Each of the four has extensive experience with toxic
119. Fees are usually at least 33 1/3 percent and sometimes 40 per-
cent of any recovery.
120. The four lawyers who responded to our survey are
1) Peter Hsiao, Morrison and Foerster LLP, Los Angeles.
2) James A. Bruen, Farella Braun & Martel LLP, San
Fransico.
3) Victor Schwartz, Shook, Hardy & Bacon LLP,
Washington, DC.
4) Chris Buckley, Gibson Dunn & Crutcher, Washington
DC.
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tort litigation. While we have sought to integrate their ideas and
concerns in this article they have not reviewed the article nor do they
necessarily agree with any views expressed herein.
It is apparent that social scientists have much to do if we as a soci-
ety are to properly evaluate the toxic tort system in particular and the
civil justice system in general. Regrettably, much change has al-
ready occurred and more is about to occur in the civil justice system
without the benefit of the hard facts that social scientists could
gather. To take one example, how can we move ahead to limit dam-
age awards as a "solution" to the so-called medical malpractice crisis
when there is no reliable evidence that 1) there is a crisis; 2) that
large damage awards are in any way responsible for any crisis that
might exist; or 3) that the legislative proposals offered are the best
way to actually reduce malpractice insurance premiums?
If the standards adopted by the United States Supreme Court in
Daubert were applied to the "evidence" offered in the debate on civil
justice reform, all such "evidence" would be excluded as scientifi-
cally unreliable. Studies could be undertaken of all the issues dis-
cussed in this article and many others, and those studies, not the an-
ecdote of the day, could form the basis for reasoned decision-
making. However, there is no indication that such a rational ap-
proach will be taken and every reason to believe the civil justice sys-
tem, like the political process, will be auctioned off to the highest
bidder. When the evidence of the gross error in shutting the court-
house door to legitimate claimants becomes manifest, it will be too
late to do anything about it. Hopefully it is not too late to prevent
the error.
2004]

